Course Outline

  1. Moral hazard, adverse selection and principal agent theory
  2. Asymmetric information and credit market
  3. Solidarity networks and reciprocity
  4. Dynamic games: extensive forms, sequential moves and the game tree, subgame
    perfection, imperfect information games and sequential equilibrium.
  5. Static games and Bayes-Nash equilibrium
  6. Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
  7. Adverse selection, signaling and screening models refinements.

Reference Books

    1. Dutta, Prajit K. (1999). Strategies and Games: Theory and Practice. The MIT Press.
    2. Freixas, Xavier, and Jean-Charles Rochet. (2008). Microeconomic of Banking. The MIT Press.
    3. Gibbons, Roberst. (1992). Game Theory for Applied Economists. Princeton University Press.
    4. Jehle, Geoffrey A. and Philip J. Reny. Advanced Microeconomic Theory. Oxford University Press. 2nd Edition.
    5. Kreps, David M. (1990). A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Princeton University Press.
    6. Mas-Colell, Andreu, Michael D. Whinston and Jerry R. Green. Microeconomic Theory. Oxford University Press.
    7. Nicholson,W. and C. Snyder (2012). Microeconomic Theory: Basic Principles and Extensions, South-Western, Cengage Learning, Mason, USA.
    8. Varian, H.R. Microeconomic Analysis, Norton and Company, New York.
    9. Wydick, Bruce. (2007). Games in Economic Development. Cambridge University Press.